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In both the 2018–2019 and 2019–2020 sessions of the Supreme Court, 
the Court granted certiorari to decide the meaning of two seemingly 
straightforward words: “person” and “sex.”1  In Return Mail, Inc. v. United 
States Postal Service, the Court had to determine if the federal government 
is considered a “person” for patent infringement purposes in the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act (AIA).2  In Bostock v. Clayton County, the 
Court consolidated three appellate court decisions to rule on whether or 
not sexual orientation and gender identity fall under the protected category 
of “sex” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3  The Court was not 
deciding whether or not to extend protections to certain groups of people; 
they were deciding whether or not the Acts already did.4 
Although judges and justices often must utilize statutory interpretation 
to determine the outcome in cases, the cases above showcase interesting 
similarities and differences.  First, the methodology used by the majority 
in these cases track along very similar lines.  Both cases (1) take a word 
that is not defined in the text, (2) address a presumption of its meaning, 
and (3) look at the context of the word to determine whether or not it can 
overcome that presumption.5  But while the methodology used in both 
cases is close to parallel, the makeup of the Justices in the majority and 
dissenting opinions flip almost completely.  Both cases were heard by the 
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same nine Justices.6  In Return Mail, Justice Sotomayor wrote for the 
majority and was joined in her opinion by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.7  Justice Breyer wrote 
a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan.8  In 
the next session of the Court, Justice Gorsuch wrote for the majority in 
Bostock, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, 
Ginsburg, and Kagan joining the opinion.9  Justice Alito wrote a dissenting 
opinion and was joined by Justice Thomas.10  Justice Kavanaugh wrote a 
dissenting opinion as well.11 
The dissenting opinions in both cases argue that the Court should have 
looked further outside of the text to come to a different conclusion.  Justice 
Breyer, in Return Mail, writes that the majority opinion is incomplete 
because it does not look at the purpose of the enactment of the AIA.12  
Justice Alito, dissenting in Bostock, also argues that the Court should have 
looked beyond the text of the Civil Rights Act because the word “sex” is 
ambiguous.13  Justice Kavanaugh, also in a dissenting opinion in Bostock, 
argues against the Court’s reliance on literal meaning, rather than ordinary 
meaning.14  Both Bostock dissenting opinions also look to post-enactment 
history.15 
Section II of this Comment discusses the history of both the AIA and 
the Civil Rights Act and how Return Mail and Bostock came to be heard 
in the Supreme Court.  This Section also does a deep dive of the majority 
opinions in both cases.  Section III provides a foundation of the main 
methods of statutory interpretation and explores the two leading schools 
of thought on methodology to use when interpreting statutes.  This Section 
also compares the two cases further, especially bringing to light the key 
arguments in the dissenting opinions.  Finally, Section III questions the 
strategic importance of ambiguity in statutory interpretation. 
II. BACKGROUND 
To understand how Return Mail and Bostock came to be heard before 
the Supreme Court, it is important to be familiar with not only the 
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 8.   Id. at 1868. 
 9.   Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1733. 
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 13.   See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1756–58 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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procedural history of the cases, but also the legislative history of each of 
the relevant Acts. 
A. Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and later heard Return Mail, Inc. 
v. United States Postal Service on February 19, 2019.16  On appeal to the 
Supreme Court, the two parties argued whether the U.S. Postal Service is 
considered a “person” to fit within the requirements of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act (AIA), a patent act the U.S. Postal Service had 
initially utilized to defend against a copyright infringement claim.17 
1. History of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
According to David Kappos, the former Director of the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act sought to “updat[e] the U.S. patent system back into being the world’s 
gold standard.”18  The AIA “[m]ove[d] the U.S. from a ‘first-to-invent’ to 
a ‘first-inventor-to-file’ system” in order to align the United States with a 
majority of the industrial world.19  It was introduced on March 30, 2011 to 
the House of Representatives.20  The House referred the AIA to the 
Committee on the Judiciary, including the Subcommittee on Intellectual 
Property, and the Committee on the Budget.21  From there the Act moved 
quickly through the House, receiving a passing vote less than three months 
later on June 23, 2011.22  The Senate passed the Act without amendment 
on September 8, 2011 and it became Public Law on September 16, 2011 
when President Obama signed it.23  The AIA seeks “[t]o amend title 35, 
United States Code, to provide for patent reform.”24 
 
 16.   139 S. Ct. 1853 (2019).   
 17.   Id. 
 18.   USPTOvideo, Fifth Anniversary of the America Invents Act, YOUTUBE  
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=15&v=bRXx6 
IRsws4&feature=emb_logo [https://perma.cc/UJ9A-U8WF].  
 19.   Kenneth E. Levitt, Patent Reform Becomes Law: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
DORSEY (Sept. 14, 2011), https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/2011/09/patent-
reform-becomes-law-the-leahysmith-america__ [https://perma.cc/8M83-Y74A]; see also David 
Goldman, Patent Reform Is Finally on Its Way, CNNMONEY (June 24, 2011, 11:05 AM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2011/06/24/technology/patent_reform_bill/index.htm  
[https://perma.cc/7MMD-B2TJ]. 
 20.   Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 21.   Id. 
 22.   Id. 
 23.   Id. 
 24.   Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 284 (2011). 
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Despite the short timeline from introduction of the AIA in the House 
to the signing of the AIA into law, the reform of patent law did not happen 
immediately.25  This Act represents the first major change passed into 
“United States patent laws since 1952.”26  That is not to say reform has not 
been tried before.  Two years prior to the passage of the AIA, Senators 
presented a similar Act, the Patent Reform Act of 2009, in the Senate.27  
But after a few months in the Senate, discussions ended and the Act was 
never introduced in the House of Representatives.28  Passage of the AIA 
was also a major accomplishment for its co-sponsors, Sen. Patrick Leahy 
and Rep. Lamar Smith, who were named as two of the four POLITICO 
policymakers of the year for their efforts.29  The two Congressmen were 
from different political parties, making the passage of this law a significant 
bipartisan accomplishment.30 
The AIA also focused on making the system more efficient in part by 
allowing the USPTO Director to set their own fees—a necessary step to 
advance the United States into the modern patent community.31  
Additionally, the AIA “created the Patent Trial and Appeal Board” which 
oversees three types of post-issuance proceedings: inter partes review, 
post-grant review, and covered-business-method review.32  All three are 
adversarial proceedings with briefings, hearings, discovery, evidence, and 
the possibility of an appeal.33 
The AIA addressed a number of issues on the front end of filing for 
patents, but was it intended to change what “person” could use the 
reformed systems in the Act after a patent was already granted?  Return 
Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service brought this very question to the 
Supreme Court.34 
2. Background of the Case 
This dispute started over a patent Return Mail, Inc. held for a method 
 
 25.   Levitt, supra note 19.   
 26.   Levitt, supra note 19.   
 27.   Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009).  
 28.   Id. 
 29.   Politico Staff, Jackson, Leahy, Smith, Ryan Named Policymakers of Year, POLITICO (Nov. 
29, 2011, 8:40 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2011/11/jackson-leahy-smith-ryan-named-
policymakers-of-year-069373 [https://perma.cc/VX6M-W2W3]. 
 30.   Id. 
 31.   USPTOvideo, supra note 18.   
 32.   Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1860 (2019). 
 33.   Id. at 1866. 
 34.   Id. at 1859. 
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of sorting undeliverable mail.35  The U.S. Postal Service created a similar 
process in 2006 which Return Mail claimed infringed its patent.36  The 
Postal Service and Return Mail then each pursued a different course of 
action to solve the dispute.37  The Postal Service petitioned the Patent 
Board for covered-business-method (CBM) review, a post-grant review 
method provision in the AIA which deals with patents that cover methods 
or machinery for performing data processing or other operations.38  
Meanwhile, Return Mail sued the Postal Service for patent infringement 
in the Court of Federal Claims.39  Ultimately, the Postal Service won both 
suits.40  The Patent Board determined that the Return Mail product was, in 
fact, “ineligible to be patented, and . . . . the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit affirmed. . . .” that the Postal Service could use the Patent 
Board’s CBM review process because they were a “person” under the 
Act.41  However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the 
ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.42 
3. The Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to determine whether a federal 
agency is a ‘person’ capable of petitioning for post-issuance review under 
the AIA.”43  The majority held that the term “person” in the AIA did not 
include the federal government or its agencies.44  The majority’s reasoning 
rested on a presumption that the meaning of the word “person” excludes 
sovereigns, and to overcome this exclusion there must be “some 
affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary.”45  Ultimately, the 
majority found no such showing.46 
As mentioned above, the majority opinion in Return Mail tracks along 
the same broad interpretative methods as Bostock.  Return Mail begins 
with (1) no set definition for the word “person,” (2) the court addresses the 
presumption that the word “person” does not include the sovereign, and it 
 
 35.   Id. at 1861. 
 36.   Id. 
 37.   Id.  
 38.   Id. at 1860–61. 
 39.   Id. at 1861. 
 40.   Id. 
 41.   Id. 
 42.   Id. at 1859, 1861–62. 
 43.   Id. at 1861. 
 44.   Id. at 1867.  
 45.   Id. at 1861–62 (quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765, 781 (2000)).  
 46.   Id. at 1867. 
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looks at (3) whether or not context in this instance can overcome the 
presumption.47 
The Court in Return Mail sought to define the word “person” since it 
was not defined in the text of the America Invents Act.48  However, luckily 
for the Court, Congress enacted the Dictionary Act in 1871 which helps to 
“determin[e] the meaning of any Act of Congress.”49  The Act was created 
“to avoid prolixity and tautology in drawing statutes and to prevent doubt 
and embarrassment in their construction.”50  The Dictionary Act does so 
by defining basic terms that are frequently used in Federal Acts, and 
providing guidelines for general grammatical rules.51  Importantly, the 
Dictionary Act does define the word “person.”52  The word “person” in 
“any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . include[s] 
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and 
joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”53  But this does not provide 
all the information needed to exclude the federal government from the 
definition.  Thus, the opinion quickly dives into presumptions from 
previous cases to determine the meaning of the word “person” in the AIA. 
The Court considered how the prior Courts had determined the 
interpretation of the word “person” in a number of other cases.54  The 
earliest case the Supreme Court cites to, United States v. Fox, concerns a 
statute using the term “person” to define who can be the recipient of a 
devise of land.55  The Court determined that this statute’s use of the term 
person “applies to natural persons, and also to artificial persons,—bodies 
politic, deriving their existence and powers from legislation,—but cannot 
be so extended as to include within its meaning the Federal government.”56  
Importantly, the Court determined that “[i]t would require an express 
definition” to include the federal government.57  This case set the 
foundation for a number of cases to follow when faced with similar 
statutory interpretation issues. 
In two cases from the 1940s, United States v. Cooper Corporation and 
 
 47.   See generally id.  
 48.   See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § § 2–3(a), 125 Stat. 284, 284–
85 (2011).  
 49.   1 U.S.C.S. § 1. 
 50.   Emily J. Barnet, Hobby Lobby and the Dictionary Act, 124 YALE L.J. F.11, 12 (2014) 
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1474 (1871) (statement of Rep. Poland)).  
 51.   Id. at 11–12; 1 U.S.C.S. § 1. 
 52.   1 U.S.C.S. § 1. 
 53.   Id. 
 54.   See Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1862–66 (2019). 
 55.   Id. at 1862–63; United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 321 (1876). 
 56.   Fox, 94 U.S. at 321. 
 57.   Id.  
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United States v. Mine Workers, the Court explains that it is common usage 
to presume the term “person” to exclude sovereigns.58  However, the cases 
found “no hard and fast rule of exclusion.”59  Rather, Cooper Corporation 
calls for multiple methods of statutory interpretation to be examined to 
ultimately decide the meaning of a word: “[t]he purpose, the subject 
matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation 
of the statute.”60  Because the presumption to exclude sovereigns from the 
definition of “person” allows other methods to overcome the presumption, 
the context of the usage of the word “person” must also be examined.61 
The majority again cites to United States v. Cooper Corporation, as 
well as Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens, to explain how much context is needed to overcome the 
Dictionary Act’s definition and the presumption of exclusion.62  While 
there is “no hard and fast rule of exclu[ding]”63 the federal government 
from being considered a “person,” there also must be “some affirmative 
showing of statutory intent to the contrary” to allow the federal 
government to be part of the definition.64  To show this “statutory intent,”65 
the Court looks to how the word “person” is used in the America Invents 
Act.66  The presumption of consistent usage canon directs judges to 
presume that a word or phrase has “the same meaning throughout a text.”67  
Generally, Congress’s assigned meaning to a word in one part of a statute 
will mean that word has the same meaning in another part of the statute.68  
However, this assumption can be overcome when a word has seemingly 
distinct meanings in distinct sections of the statute.69 
The majority holds that the consistent-usage canon does not support 
 
 58.   United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604–05 (1941); United States v. United Mine 
Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947). 
 59.   Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. at 604–05. 
 60.   Id. at 605. 
 61.   See Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1862–63. 
 62.   Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. at 604–06 (1941); Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781 (2000). 
 63.   Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. at 604–05. 
 64.   Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 781.  
 65.   Id. 
 66.   Return Mail, 139 S. Ct. at 1863. 
 67.   Katharine Clark & Matthew Connolly, A Guide to Reading, Interpreting, and Applying 
Statutes, THE WRITING CTR. AT GEO. L. CTR. 7 (Suraj Kumar & Taylor Beech  
revs., 2017), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/A-Guide-to-Reading-
Interpreting-and-Applying-Statutes-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ7A-ENWD]. 
 68.   Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86 (2006) (citing IBP, 
Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005)).  
 69.   Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 319–20 (2014) (quoting Env’t. Def. v. Duke 
Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007)).  
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including the government in the definition of “person.”70  They conclude 
that since there is inconsistent usage of the word “person” in the Act, “the 
mere existence of some Government-inclusive references cannot make the 
‘affirmative showing,’ required to overcome the presumption that 
Congress did not intend to include the Government” in the definition of 
the word “person.”71  The majority wrote that the usage of the word 
“person” in the statute followed no clear pattern.72  In some instances it 
appears that the word “person” clearly includes the government, but, in 
other instances, the word clearly does not include the government.73  The 
majority determined that the first time the word “person” is used 
inconsistently with previous uses in the AIA, the word in the Act fails the 
consistent-usage canon necessary to overcome the presumption that the 
government is excluded from the definition of the word “person.”74  After 
this determination on meaning in the context stage, the Court does not 
spend time on the other factors laid out in the Cooper Corporation case.  
As such, the majority determined that the inconsistent use of the word in 
the AIA fails to make an “affirmative showing” that can overcome the 
presumption that the word “person” does not include the federal 
government.75 
B. Bostock v. Clayton County 
Much like Return Mail, the decision in Bostock turned on the Court’s 
interpretation of a statute.  The Court granted certiorari in three cases to 
determine whether the word “sex,” as used in Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, included protection from discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity.76 
1. History of the Civil Rights Act 
Unlike the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), the history of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 has a been a topic of extensive academic study 
and scholarship, so this part will be brief.  Although the movement toward 
the Act had been brewing in the country for many years, the 
 
 70.   See Return Mail, 139 S. Ct. at 1863 (suggesting that were the cannon to apply without 
exception, it might weigh strongly in the favor of the Postal Service). 
 71.   Id. at 1865 (quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 
781 (2000)) (internal citation omitted). 
 72.   Id. at 1863. 
 73.   Id. 
 74.   Id. at 1865.  
 75.   Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 76.   Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737–38 (2020). 
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demonstrations of civil rights activists in the early 1960s were a major 
catalyst for legal change.77  On June 11, 1963, President John Kennedy 
announced that he planned “to propose a comprehensive civil rights bill.”78  
His bill would address equal access to public accommodation, school 
desegregation, expand the Civil Rights Commission, and, in Title VII, 
create a Committee on Equal Employment to oversee “the conduct of 
federal contractors.”79  However, the Committee, and the rest of the bill, 
focused on public discrimination, not on the acts of private individuals and 
companies.80 
On June 19, 1963, the “bill was introduced in both houses of 
Congress,” but its supporters pushed for it to begin first in the House of 
Representatives to gain momentum before going to the Senate.81  The bill 
made its way through committees and markups throughout the summer 
and fall but was still pending in the House on November 22, 1963 when 
President Kennedy was assassinated.82  When President Lyndon Johnson 
took over office, he made it clear he supported the bill and that “the earliest 
possible passage of the civil rights bill” was the best way to honor 
President Kennedy’s memory.83 
Finally, in February of 1964 the bill was ready to move over to the 
Senate.84  But not before one significant (and especially important to the 
Bostock case) amendment was added.  “On February 8, 1964, the Rules 
Committee Chairman [Howard ‘Judge’ Smith] proposed the addition of 
the word ‘sex’ to Title VII’s list of impermissible bases for employment 
decisions.”85  Lesser-known history shows that Judge Smith had spent 
years—33 years in fact—serving in the House, actively working to kill 
progressive legislation, including civil rights legislation.86  If his motives 
for expanding the reach of this bill seem suspicious to you, you might be 
right.  Alice Paul and the National Women’s Party asked Judge Smith to 
include “sex” in the bill, which he saw as a way to make the bill look 
 
 77.   WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., JAMES J. BRUDNEY, JOSH CHAFETZ, PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & 
ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND 
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 2 (West Academic Publishing, 6th ed. 2020).  
 78.   Id. 
 79.   Id. 
 80.   Id. 
 81.   Id. at 4. 
 82.   Id. at 4–7. 
 83.   Id. at 7. 
 84.   Id. at 10–11. 
 85.   Id. at 10. 
 86.   Id. at 7. 
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ridiculous and ultimately fail in the Senate.87  In fact, many representatives 
were playing this game: the bill’s passage in the House is credited more 
toward southern opponents of the bill voting yes, to push an unpassable 
bill into the Senate to fail.88 
Unfortunately for the opponents of the bill, their plan to add “sex” to 
kill the bill in the Senate did not work.  The bill spent many months in the 
Senate, but on June 19, 1964, it received a passing vote.89  And it remained 
vastly the same as the bill that was passed in the House.90  Finally, on July 
2, 1964, President Johnson signed H.R. 7152 into law and The Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 was born.91 
2. Background of the Three Cases That Formed the Bostock Opinion 
The Civil Rights Act has been widely used since its passage in 1964.  
Title VII alone has provided protection from employment discrimination 
against individuals “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.”92  In Bostock, the justices deciding the scope of the 
word “sex” examined caselaw since Title VII’s enactment, which 
illuminated examples of the Act providing protection from a wide array of 
sex-based employment discrimination.93  The Bostock Court’s focus was 
on whether the word “sex” provides protection for individuals 
discriminated against because of their sexual orientation or gender 
identity.94 
In the first case, Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners, 
Gerald Bostock was a nationally-recognized child welfare advocate 
working for Clayton County, Georgia.95  Mr. Bostock joined a gay 
recreational softball league after working for the county for ten years and 
 
 87.   See id. at 10; see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1752 (2020) (describing 
Smith’s motivation in making the addition as being “[n]ot necessarily because he was interested in 
rooting out sex discrimination in all its forms, but because he may have hoped to scuttle the whole 
Civil Rights Act and thought that adding language covering sex discrimination would serve as a poison 
pill.”). 
 88.   See, e.g., Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754 (“Some of those who supported adding language to 
Title VII to ban sex discrimination may have hoped it would derail the entire Civil Rights Act.  Yet, 
contrary to those intentions, the bill became law.”); see also ESKRIDGE, ET. AL., supra note 77, at 10. 
But see Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1307, 1320–29 (2012). 
 89.   ESKRIDGE, supra note 77, at 16. 
 90.   Id. at 17. 
 91.   Id. at 18. 
 92.   42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West). 
 93.   Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739–41 (2020).  
 94.   Id. at 1737–38. 
 95.   Id. at 1737. 
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was quickly “fired for conduct ‘unbecoming’ a county employee.”96  He 
brought suit under Title VII alleging “unlawful discrimination on the basis 
of sex.”97  In the second case, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., Donald 
Zarda was also fired from his job as a skydiving instructor just days after 
he mentioned he was gay.98  The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the Bostock 
case as a matter of law, holding that Title VII does not prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.99  However, the Second Circuit 
ruling in Zarda held that discrimination based on sexual orientation “does 
violate Title VII.”100 
And in the third case, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. 
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., Aimee Stephens, a transgender 
woman, worked for a family-owned and run funeral home, presenting as a 
man when she first started her job.101  After two years on the job, she began 
living as a woman in her personal life.102  In her sixth year working for the 
funeral home, Ms. Stephens expressed to her employer her plan to come 
to work as a female and was quickly fired.103  The Sixth Circuit held “that 
Title VII bars employers from firing employees because of their 
transgender status.”104 
3. The Majority Opinion 
Justice Gorsuch surprised many when his name appeared as the author 
of an opinion holding that Title VII does protect against discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  During oral arguments, 
Justice Gorsuch, a textualist, seemed to agree that the plain meaning of the 
text favored a ruling that “sex” includes transgender status.105  But almost 
in the same breath, he argued the other side, saying “should [the judge] 
take into consideration the massive social upheaval that would be entailed 
in such a decision, and the possibility that—that Congress didn’t think 
about it?”106  But his opinion followed a textualist pattern similar to the 
 
 96.   Id. at 1737–38. 
 97.   Id. at 1738. 
 98.   Id. 
 99.   Id. (citing Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 723 F. App’x. 964, 964–65 (11th Cir. 2018)). 
 100.   Id. (citing Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2018)) (emphasis 
added). 
 101.   Id. 
 102.   Id. 
 103.   Id. 
 104.   Id. (citing EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 600 (6th Cir. 
2018)). 
 105.   Transcript of Oral Argument at 24–25, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 
139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107).  
 106.   Id. at 26–27. 
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Return Mail case from the 2018–2019 session: (1) begin with an undefined 
word (“sex”), (2) address the presumption of the ordinary dictionary 
definition of the word, and (3) turn to the context in which the word “sex” 
is found to see if the presumption can be overcome.107 
Because the Court was tasked with deciding whether or not the word 
“sex” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act includes protections from 
discrimination because of an individual’s sexual orientation and gender 
identity, and it is not defined in the Act, they first looked to dictionary 
definitions of the word.108  The Court began with a dictionary definition of 
“sex” that would provide the ordinary public meaning of the word in 
1964.109  Roughly comprehensive dictionaries at the time state that “the 
term ‘sex’ in 1964 referred to ‘status as either male or female [as] 
determined by reproductive biology.’”110  Despite employees’ reasoning 
that the definition has a much broader scope, the Court proceeds in the 
opinion working under the assumption that the definition is as stated 
above—it only includes biological differences.111  However, once again, a 
presumption (or “assumption”) can be overcome by context. 
Justice Gorsuch goes on to say this dictionary definition is “just a 
starting point.  The question is not just what ‘sex’ meant, but what Title 
VII says about it.”112  There are three key phrases in the relevant section 
of Title VII that provide the context the Court uses to overcome the 
dictionary definition of sex: “because of,” “discriminate against,” and 
“individual.”113 
Beginning with “because of,” Justice Gorsuch cites to multiple 
previous Supreme Court decisions.114  This line of reasoning produces a 
broad but-for test to determine if an action is taken “because of sex.”115  
Justice Gorsuch devotes a significant amount of his opinion to this 
concept, bolstering its credibility through examples.116  Actions by 
employers do not have to be based solely on their employees’ sex, but if 
their sex is a factor in the decision, this but-for test has been satisfied.117  
He applies this test to one previous Supreme Court case, Phillips v. Martin 
 
 107.   Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731. 
 108.   Id. at 1738–40. 
 109.   Id. at 1739. 
 110.   Id. (alteration in original). 
 111.   Id. 
 112.   Id. 
 113.   Id. at 1739–41.  
 114.   Id. at 1739. 
 115.   Id. at 1739–40. 
 116.   Id. at 1745–48. 
 117.   Id. at 1739.  
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Marietta Corporation, to show how it plays out.118  In that case, a woman 
was not hired because of the company’s policy not to hire mothers with 
young children.119  That same policy did not limit the hiring of fathers with 
young children.120  Phillips could explain her not being hired “because she 
was a mother, or because she had young children,” and not necessarily 
because she was a woman.121  But sex was a factor and therefore the Court 
determined it was a violation of Title VII.122 
Justice Gorsuch concedes that sexual orientation and gender identity 
do not fit neatly into the dictionary definition of “sex.”123  But he explains 
that the strict dictionary definition of the word was never the only thing 
the Act intended to protect, saying:124 
We agree that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts 
from sex.  But, as we’ve seen, discrimination based on homosexuality or 
transgender status necessarily entails discrimination based on sex; the 
first cannot happen without the second.  Nor is there any such thing as a 
“canon of donut holes,” in which Congress’s failure to speak directly to 
a specific case that falls within a more general statutory rule creates a 
tacit exception.  Instead, when Congress chooses not to include any 
exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule.  And that is 
exactly how this Court has always approached Title VII.  “Sexual 
harassment” is conceptually distinct from sex discrimination, but it can 
fall within Title VII’s sweep.  Same with “motherhood 
discrimination.”125 
Justice Gorsuch will not budge on the test.  He writes, “[y]ou can call 
the statute’s but-for causation test what you will—expansive, legalistic, 
the dissents even dismiss it as wooden or literal. But it is the law.”126 
Of course, Title VII does not limit all actions by employers “because 
of” sex, just those in which employers “discriminate against” an 
individual.127  The Court first looks to see what the dictionary definition 
of “discriminate” would have been in 1964.128  According to the second 
edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary in 1954, discriminate 
means: “To make a difference in treatment or favor (of one as compared 
 
 118.   Id. at 1745 (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543 (1971)). 
 119.   Id. at 1743. 
 120.   Id. 
 121.   Id. at 1745. 
 122.   Id. 
 123.   Id. at 1746–47. 
 124.   Id. 
 125.   Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 126.   Id. at 1745. 
 127.   Id. at 1740 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West)). 
 128.   Id. 
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with others).”129  Combining the meaning of “because of” and 
“discriminate against” the Court determines that “an employer who 
intentionally treats a person worse because of sex—such as by firing the 
person for actions or attributes it would tolerate in an individual of another 
sex—discriminates against that person in violation of Title VII.”130  But 
again, the context surrounding the word “sex” does not end there. 
The final important word in Title VII is “individual.”  The Act protects 
individuals from discrimination, not groups, and the distinction is 
critical.131  Again, Justice Gorsuch provides a very clear and illustrative 
example: 
Suppose an employer fires a woman for refusing his sexual advances.  
It’s no defense for the employer to note that, while he treated that 
individual woman worse than he would have treated a man, he gives 
preferential treatment to female employees overall.  The employer is 
liable for treating this woman worse in part because of her sex.132 
This important distinction is what truly protects against unequal 
treatment; otherwise, employers could treat all women worse than men 
and get away with it. 
Justice Gorsuch continues the opinion for many more pages after this 
determination.  He gives countless other hypotheticals,133 provides 
overviews of other Supreme Court decisions which determined the scope 
of Title VII’s protections,134 and explains and rebuts arguments from the 
employers.135  But the dissent is not happy with what they perceive as 
Justice Gorsuch “legislating” with this decision.136 
III. ANALYSIS 
While the cases cover two very different topics, the methods the 
Courts follow in each are very similar.  Both majority opinions follow a 
largely textual-based approach, not straying too far from the text of the 
Acts themselves.  However, there are two major differences in these cases: 
 
 129.   Id. (quoting Discriminate, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1954)). 
 130.   Id. 
 131.   Id. at 1740–41. 
 132.   Id. at 1741. 
 133.   Id. at 1741–43. 
 134.   Id. at 1743–44. 
 135.   Id. at 1744–45. 
 136.   Id. at 1754 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“There is only one word for what the Court has done today: 
legislation.”); id. at 1822 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Under the Constitution’s separation of powers, 
the responsibility to amend Title VII belongs to Congress and the President in the legislative process, 
not to this Court.”). 
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the outcomes, and the justices who make up the majority and dissenting 
sides. 
In Return Mail, the Court rules that “person” does not include the 
federal government (and therefore the United States Postal Service) 
mainly because the context of the word in the Act does not give a definite 
answer that it does.137  The majority opinion is written by Justice 
Sotomayor, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Thomas, 
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joining the opinion.138  Justice Breyer wrote a 
dissenting opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan.139 
In Bostock, the Court rules that “because of an individual’s. . .sex” 
does include sexual orientation and gender identity mainly because the 
context of the word in the Act provides reasons that it could be included.140  
The majority opinion is written by Justice Gorsuch, with Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan joining the 
opinion.141  Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice 
Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh wrote a dissent as well.142 
To determine how these decisions came out the way they did, it is 
important to first build a brief foundation of the main methods of statutory 
interpretation, not just the methods the majorities used in these cases.  
Then, it is essential to examine the statutory interpretation camps into 
which most justices fall.  Finally, this Comment questions whether these 
methods and theories hold much weight when highly politicized issues are 
at stake. 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
Return Mail and Bostock both utilize various methods of statutory 
interpretation in both the majority and dissenting opinions.  However, 
“most of the ‘rules’ of statutory interpretation are judge-made”143 and 
should therefore be examined through an understanding that judges’ 
personal views play a role in their decision-making.  Even so, an 
understanding of statutory interpretation is critical to understand why 
decisions are made in many cases. 
 
 137.   See Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1859, 1863–65 (2019). 
 138.   Id. at 1855. 
 139.   Id. 
 140.   Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753–54. 
 141.   Id. at 1733. 
 142.   Id. 
 143.   Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 333, 336 (2003–04) (footnote omitted). 
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1. Methods 
Four tools of statutory interpretation are especially useful when 
deciding what a statute means: (1) the plain meaning of the text, (2) prior 
legal interpretations, (3) the context in which the term is used, and (4) the 
purpose of the statute.144  First, using the plain meaning of text can resolve 
disputes quickly if there is a definitions section in the statute.145  However, 
that is not always the case.  Second, legal interpretations can be helpful if 
there are other cases that have already interpreted this same question.146  
Again, this is not always available.  Third, courts can interpret the word 
through context, which includes cross-referencing the word in other 
sections.147  This step often includes also looking at prior cases that did not 
examine the exact question at hand but can assist in answering unknowns.  
Finally, it is often useful to consider the purpose of the text, i.e. legislative 
intent, as well as any relevant legislative history.148 
a. Text 
Most justices agree that the text is the place to start for any statutory 
interpretation question.  When words or phrases are not defined in the 
Act’s definitions section “[c]ourts generally assume that the words of a 
statute mean what an ‘ordinary’ or ‘reasonable’ person would understand 
them to mean.”149  This can generally be deduced by looking at dictionary 
definitions or common law usage of a word.150 
b. Precedent 
Next, if there is a case that is on point with a similar issue and facts, 
courts will often follow the outcome.151  The legal system in the United 
States follows the concept of stare decisis, wherein courts look at rulings 
in previous cases to follow their precedents.152  The system also promotes 
a presumption against changing the common law, which means that those 
 
 144.   Clark & Connolly, supra note 67, at 2–10.  
 145.   See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45153, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS, 19 (2018) (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000)) 
(noting that courts look to common meaning after they fail to find the term defined within the pertinent 
statute itself). 
 146.   Clark & Connolly, supra note 67 at 5–6.   
 147.   Id. at 7–9.  
 148.   Id. at 9–10.  
 149.   Id. at 3. 
 150.   Id. at 3. 
 151.   Id. at 5–6. 
 152.   See id. at 5–6.  
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interpreting a statute should do so in a way that does not alter the common 
law unless there is a clear indication otherwise.153 
c. Context & Statutory Structure 
This step involves digging deeper into the statute itself.  To determine 
the meaning of a word through the context of a statute, courts often use 
canons of construction, “a set of background norms and conventions that 
are widely” followed.154  In fact, this practice has become more common, 
with over 40% of Supreme Court majority opinions now utilizing canons 
of construction in their decisions.155  As utilized in the Return Mail case, 
the consistent usage canon means that judges presume that a word or 
phrase has “the same meaning throughout a text.”156  Courts have agreed 
that interpreting the meaning of a word must be “a holistic endeavor” 
because often an ambiguous section of the text may be made clear when 
“the same terminology is used elsewhere” in the Act.157 
d. Purpose & Legislative History 
Finally, the purpose of the text is often examined to gain a fuller 
understanding of the meaning of the text.158  This includes looking at 
legislative history and reasoning for enacting a statute because this helps 
explain what Congress wanted the statute to encompass, even if the 
definitions are not clear.159  However, this step is generally taken only 
when there is so much ambiguity in the text, context, and precedent, that 
no clear meaning can be interpreted before this point.160  And some judges 
and justices believe this step should never be taken in statutory 
interpretation.161 
2. Competing Schools of Thought 
While the steps taken by the courts are useful methods of statutory 
 
 153.   Id. at 6.  
 154.   Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 344 
(2010). 
 155.   Id. at 345.  
 156.   Clark & Connolly, supra note 67, at 7. 
 157.   United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). 
 158.   Clark & Connolly, supra note 67, at 9. 
 159.   Id. at 9–10.  
 160.   Brannon, supra note 145, at 44 (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of purpose as a last 
resort “to avoid the type of calamitous result that Congress plainly meant to avoid”) (quoting King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015)). 
 161.   See infra Section III.A.2.a. 
188 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
interpretation, it is important to point out that not all legal scholars believe 
that statutory interpretation should follow every step.  Two major differing 
theories dominate the field of statutory interpretation—textualism and 
purposivism—and many judges and justices have fallen into one of these 
categories throughout the years.162  Also, as seen in both the Return Mail 
and Bostock majority opinions, sometimes statutory interpretation cases 
do not walk through all the steps outlined above.  This can be because not 
all methods are necessary to making a determination or even because the 
judge writing the opinion does not believe there is value in a particular 
method.163  Outside influences and politics may also play a role in the 
esteemed Court’s decisions. 
a. Textualism 
Justice Scalia was a major proponent of the interpretation method of 
textualism, which would have the Court “use only the plain meaning of 
the Constitution’s text.”164  On today’s court, Justice Gorsuch has taken 
over as one of the most stringent textualists.165  Textualists interpret words 
consistent with how they believe the Framers would have defined them.  
This methodology includes defining words narrowly or relying heavily on 
dictionary definitions of the words.166  Strict textualists like Justice Scalia 
do not support using legislative history in statutory interpretation for any 
reason.167  But context can play a role in statutory interpretation for some 
textualists, especially as textualism has evolved over time.168 
b. Purposivism 
Despite falling under a different school of thought, generally all 
justices have some characteristics of textualism because they cannot 
ignore what the text of statutes actually says.169  Purposivism and 
textualism have some similar practices but divide on whether 
 
 162.   Brannon, supra note 145, at 10–18. 
 163.   See Brannon, supra note 145, at 19.  
 164.   David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia’s Fidelity to 
His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1382 (1999).  
 165.   Richard Primus, The Supreme Court Case Testing the Limits of Gorsuch’s Textualism, 
POLITICO (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/10/15/lgbt-discrimination-
supreme-court-gorsuch-textualism-229850 [https://perma.cc/D2SJ-HAN5].  
 166.   See Zlotnick, supra note 164, at 1382–84. 
 167.   Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
2085, 2150 (2002). 
 168.   The Rise of Purposivism and Fall of Chevron: Major Statutory Cases in the Supreme Court, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2017) [hereinafter The Rise of Purposivism].  
 169.   Primus, supra note 165. 
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interpretation can extend beyond just the text itself.170  Traditionally, 
purposivism used Congress’ legislative process to discern what Congress 
was trying to accomplish with the passage of a new act.171  This task, 
however, is not always easy due to the “limited foresight, legislative time 
and [scarce] resources” of Congress, so purposivists believe courts must 
go beyond just what a statute says to figure out its meaning.172  As the 
name implies, purposivism is all about figuring out the purpose of the act.  
And in recent years, some believe that the Court has been moving toward 
this school of interpretation.173  However, both Return Mail and Bostock 
base their decision on mostly textual arguments. 
B. Comparing the Cases 
As explained previously, these cases are interesting because on the 
surface they seem to belong in entirely different realms.  Return Mail 
involved patent law and produced a decision that affects just the federal 
government.174  Bostock involved civil rights and its holding affects many, 
many people—far more than Return Mail.175  But both cases were 6-3 
decisions.176  Both cases were written by a liberal or conservative justice 
and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and remaining four were opposite 
political leaning of the writing justice.177  Both involved statutory 
interpretation of a word that turned on the context in which it was found.178  
And the dissenting justices in both cases argue that purpose and legislative 
history should be examined to truly determine the meaning of the words 
at issue.179  But the cases diverge on what it takes to get to the step of 
examining the purpose of a statute and that divergence rests in part on 
ambiguity.180 
1. Return Mail & Statutory Interpretation 
In Return Mail, the Court rules that “person,” as used in the AIA, does 
not include the federal government, which in this case means the United 
 
 170.   The Rise of Purposivism, supra note 168, at 1229. 
 171.   John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 120–21 (2011).  
 172.   Id.  
 173.   The Rise of Purposivism, supra note 168, at 1248. 
 174.   See supra Section II.A. 
 175.   See supra Section II.B. 
 176.   See supra Section I. 
 177.   See supra Section I. 
 178.   See supra Section I. 
 179.   See supra Section I. 
 180.   See supra Section I. 
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States Postal Service.181  Justice Sotomayor wrote a mostly textual 
opinion, only really looking at the text and context of the word inside the 
Act.182  The plain meaning of the text often gives courts a reason to stop 
interpretation at this step.183  So the Court looked to the Dictionary Act 
first which defines the word “person” to “include corporations, companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as 
well as individuals.”184  Because the federal government is not in the list, 
neither the majority nor the dissent make much mention of trying to fit it 
into one of the categories listed.185  But there are a couple of pieces to the 
Dictionary Act’s definition that allow for more analysis of its meaning.186 
First, the Act has a caveat that provides for the “context [to] indicate[] 
otherwise” when utilizing any of the Dictionary Act’s definitions.187  This 
inclusion seems like a strategic move on the part of the drafters.  It allows 
for any term defined previously to be redefined in the mind of the 
interpreter based on where it is used.188  Additionally, the Dictionary Act 
uses the word “includes,” which can indicate that this list does not mean 
other persons are excluded from its definition in the first place.189  Again, 
this makes the Dictionary Act less restrictive.  Not only have its drafters 
allowed for context to shift the meaning depending on what the interpreter 
wants, it does not even provide an all-exclusive definition.  The Return 
Mail majority leans on the definition in the Dictionary Act as fairly 
unwavering,190 which does not seem to fit with the open-endedness of the 
Act.  Because of this uncertainty, the word “person” cannot be defined 
simply by stopping at the first step of statutory interpretation and following 
exactly what the definition says.  Therefore, interpretation is required to 
move beyond reliance on just the plain meaning of the text. 
Based on prior cases, the Court explained that it is common usage to 
presume the term “person” excludes sovereigns.191  But the Court also 
acknowledges that this “is not a ‘hard and fast rule.’”192  Prior cases utilize 
 
 181.   Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1867 (2019). 
 182.   See id. at 1858–68. 
 183.   See BRANNON, supra note 145, at 13–16.  
 184.   1 U.S.C.S. § 1. 
 185.   See generally, Return Mail, 139 S. Ct. at 1862. 
 186.   See 1 U.S.C.S. § 1. 
 187.   Id. 
 188.   Michael J. Gerardi, The “Person” at Federal Law: A Framework and a RICO Test Suite, 
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2239, 2251–52 (2009).   
 189.   See id.  
 190.   See Return Mail, 139 S. Ct. at 1862. 
 191.   Id. at 1861–62 (quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765, 780 (2000)). 
 192.   Id. at 1862 (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604–05 (1941)). 
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also “[t]he purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, 
[or] the executive interpretation” of the statute to determine whether the 
presumption can be overcome.193  This leads the Court to examine 
context.194 
The specific use of “person” at argument in this case is in Section 18 
of the America Invents Act.195  The pertinent text reads: “A person may 
not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect to a covered 
business method patent unless the person or the person’s real party in 
interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been 
charged with infringement under that patent.”196  The meaning of “person” 
is unclear in that section and is also seemingly inconsistent with usage in 
other sections.  Early in the AIA, Section 3 uses “person” in the following 
way: “a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed 
invention pertains.”197  This clearly cannot mean the government, because 
the government cannot possess a skill in the arts.  Yet later in the AIA, the 
text reads: “A person shall be entitled to a defense . . . .”198  This clearly 
could include the government as a “person.” 
The dissent did not see this inconsistency as a reason to conclude that 
the word “person,” when used to refer to who may use CBM review 
process for patent disputes, excludes the federal government.199  Justice 
Breyer wrote that the times “person” is used where it is not referring to the 
government are times when that meaning is “close to logically 
impossible.”200  This is because in those instances the context surrounding 
the word “person” is clearly referring to a single person or a human being 
capable of actions any non-human entity would not be capable of.201  
Therefore, the use of “person” in relation to the CBM review process could 
logically include the federal government because it is a function the 
government could physically be capable of.202 
Here is where the schools of thought on statutory interpretation play a 
big role.  For the majority, the presumption of consistent usage canon cuts 
off the ability to overcome the presumption of excluding sovereigns after 
 
 193.   Id.at 1868 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane 
Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 83 (1991)).  
 194.   Id. at 1863 (majority opinion).  
 195.   Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a), 125 Stat. 284, 329–31 
(2011).  
 196.   Id.  
 197.   Id. § 3(c).  
 198.   Id. § 5(a).  
 199.   See Return Mail, 139 S. Ct. at 1868–69 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 200.   Id. at 1869. 
 201.   See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 3(c). 
 202.   See Return Mail, 139 S. Ct. at 1869–70. 
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the first time the word “person” is used inconsistently with previous uses 
in the AIA because there is no “affirmative showing.”203  But the dissent, 
written by purposivist Justice Breyer, emphasizes the purpose and 
legislative history of the statute to prove that affirmative showing.204 
The majority does concede that the federal government has a 
“longstanding history with the patent system.”205  Yet, they believe that 
this history is not relevant in determining Congress’ purpose for enacting 
this new patent statute.206  The majority concludes that the new system of 
patent review under the AIA is not affected by the history that the federal 
government has with patents because the AIA system proceedings are very 
different.207  The old system, ex parte reexamination, which is still 
available to the federal government, allows the Patent Office to decide 
which patents to reexamine and does so internally without the challenger 
participating in the process.208  This is very different than the systems 
under the AIA, which are “adversarial, adjudicatory proceedings between 
the ‘person’ who petitioned for review and the patent owner . . . .”209  The 
majority believes Congress would not want the federal government to 
participate in the adversarial patent review process because the possibility 
of an “awkward situation that might result” when a nongovernmental 
patent owner has to defend her patent under one federal agency, the Patent 
Office, against another federal agency, in this case, the U.S. Postal 
Service.210 
The dissent’s stance is that Congress clearly intended for the word 
“person” to include the federal government because of the legislative 
history and the federal government’s prior patent rights.211  Before the 
AIA, the federal government was considered a “person” who could 
“invoke the administrative review procedures.”212  Congress enacted the 
AIA “to ‘improve the quality of patents’ and ‘make the patent system more 
efficient,’” not to change the interpretation of the word “person.”213  The 
dissent explains that the purpose of the AIA “show[s] even more clearly 
that Congress intended the term ‘person’ to include the Government” 
 
 203.   Id. at 1865 (majority opinion) (quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781 (2000)). 
 204.   Id. at 1870 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 205.   Id. at 1865 (majority opinion). 
 206.   Id. at 1865–66. 
 207.   Id.  
 208.   Id. at 1865–66, 1865 n.9. 
 209.   Id. at 1866. 
 210.   Id. at 1867.  
 211.   Id. at 1870 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 212.   Id.  
 213.   Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 112–98(I), pt. 1, at 48 (2011)).  
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because its purpose was about improving the patent system’s efficiency, 
not changing who could use it.214 
Additionally, the dissent explains that the “awkward” situation the 
majority imagines is nothing new for legal disputes with the federal 
government.215  The majority thinks it would be an awkward situation to 
let the federal government utilize the administrative processes to challenge 
the patent in an adversarial way because the dispute would be resolved by 
another federal agency.216  But the converse could also happen if a private 
citizen used the administrative procedures against the federal 
government.217  So, again, it would be two federal agencies and one private 
citizen in the dispute.  As Justice Breyer puts in his dissenting opinion: 
“the situation the majority attempts to avoid is already baked into the 
cake,” meaning it cannot be avoided.218 
The dissent opined that the methods of statutory interpretation all 
worked in favor of showing the intent to overcome the Dictionary Act’s 
exclusion.219  The dissent’s analysis considers not only the AIA’s use of 
the word “person,” but also other patent provisions which include the 
government in the definition of “person.”220  Their analysis combines 
multiple steps of statutory interpretation by looking at context in the AIA 
and other legal interpretation outside of the AIA.221  This leads them to 
determine “person” would include the federal government.222  Justice 
Breyer digs deep into his purposivist beliefs to argue that the majority’s 
ruling is incorrect because it is incomplete. 
Before diving into the Bostock decision, it is important to reorient 
which justices were on which side in Return Mail.  The majority opinion 
is written by Justice Sotomayor, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joining the opinion.223  Justice 
Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
Kagan.224 
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2. Bostock & Statutory Interpretation 
Switching gears in Bostock, the makeup of the justices was as follows: 
Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion with Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan joining the opinion.225  
Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Thomas, and 
Justice Kavanaugh wrote a separate dissent as well.226  Again, the majority 
opinion is based in textual reasoning, but the justices that favored this in 
Return Mail—Alito, Thomas, and Kavanaugh—have moved to a 
dissenting opinion, which advocates going beyond the text. 
In Bostock, the Court ruled that the phrase “because of an individual’s 
. . . sex” does include sexual orientation and gender identity in Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act.227  Justice Gorsuch walks through a textualist 
approach to reach this conclusion in his majority opinion.228  He begins 
with the word itself, “sex,” and attempts to define it with its ordinary 
meaning at the time the Civil Rights Act was enacted.229  His query brings 
him to a definition that “sex” in 1964 was a “status as either male or female 
[as] determined by reproductive biology.”230  However, his analysis 
explains that this presumed definition of “sex” is incomplete because of 
the context within which it is written.231  Justice Gorsuch determines the 
full meaning of “sex” by also defining “because of,” “discriminate 
against,” and “individual,” so the context in which the word “sex” is found 
overcomes the presumption of ordinary meaning.232  Both dissenting 
opinions emphasize that the majority’s key mistake in this decision is the 
fact that it was legislating with its ruling.233  And both provide some 
support for their opinions through the definition of “sex.”234 
Justice Kavanaugh, who “sees himself as a textualist”235 disagrees 
with the method Justice Gorsuch used for determining the meaning of the 
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word “sex.”236  He has two main issues with Justice Gorsuch’s approach: 
not using ordinary meaning and not defining a phrase as a whole.237  To 
Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Gorsuch is using the literal meaning of “sex” 
to include “sexual orientation” instead of using the ordinary meaning.238  
Justice Kavanaugh provides a laundry list of cases to support the 
“foundational interpretive principle that courts adhere to ordinary 
meaning, not literal meaning, when interpreting statutes.”239  He goes on 
to emphasize that following a word’s ordinary meaning is critical to 
maintain “rule of law and democratic accountability.”240  But in supporting 
that argument, his reasoning behind the importance of ordinary meaning 
seems to conflict with the reality of our society today. 
A society governed by the rule of law must have laws that are known and 
understandable to the citizenry.  And judicial adherence to ordinary 
meaning facilitates the democratic accountability of America’s elected 
representatives for the laws they enact.  Citizens and legislators must be 
able to ascertain the law by reading the words of the statute.  Both the 
rule of law and democratic accountability badly suffer when a court 
adopts a hidden or obscure interpretation of the law, and not its ordinary 
meaning.241 
He supports ordinary meaning so that citizens can understand the law.  But 
this relies on the assumption that all Americans adopt the same ordinary 
meaning of words and phrases, which is certainly not true.  And as a 
society, our perception of what is “ordinary” continues to evolve.242 
Justice Kavanaugh also emphasizes that “Courts must heed the 
ordinary meaning of the phrase as a whole, not just the meaning of the 
words in the phrase.”243  He is critical of Justice Gorsuch defining “sex,” 
“because of,” “discriminate against,” and “individual” separately and 
combining their definitions to determine the phase’s meaning.244  He 
writes: “Do not simply split statutory phrases into their component words, 
look up each in a dictionary, and then mechanically put them together 
again . . . .”245  Justice Kavanaugh provides examples to support his 
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methodology of defining phrases as a whole: the “American flag,” a “cold 
war,” or a “three-pointer.”246  It is easy to see that those phrases refer to 
this country’s flag, a brewing conflict, and a basketball score, when their 
parts could support a less common definition. 
But Justice Gorsuch had to define a much more complicated phrase.  
The words he is defining in the Civil Rights Act are not neatly stacked 
together in a phrase.  The pertinent portion states it is unlawful for an 
employer to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .247 
It would be logically impossible for him to define this phrase without 
looking at and defining the individual words scattered throughout. 
Justice Alito, in his dissenting opinion, passionately exclaims: “The 
Court’s argument [that the text is unambiguous] is not only arrogant, it is 
wrong.  It fails on its own terms.  ‘Sex,’ ‘sexual orientation,’ and ‘gender 
identity’ are different concepts, as the Court concedes.”248  He sees the text 
as ambiguous and does not agree with the majority that “discrimination 
because of sexual orientation or gender identity inherently or necessarily 
entails discrimination because of sex.”249  Because he claims “sex” in the 
Act is ambiguous, Justice Alito focuses on Congress’ intent with the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act.250  He criticizes the majority for “fl[ying] 
a textualist flag,” and determining the word “sex” was unambiguous so the 
definition could be determined by looking solely at the text.251 
Instead, Justice Alito looks at the legislative history of the addition of 
the word “sex” to show that it was clearly pushed in at the last second for 
women’s rights.252  However, after examining the history of the Civil 
Rights Act, it seems very suspicious to rely on very isolated parts of 
legislative process.253  As with many bills, the process is long and involves 
many rounds of negotiations and changes to make a bill passable.  Justice 
Alito’s dissent almost seems to call out the justices that generally 
emphasize the importance of Congressional intent in statutory 
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interpretation: “For those who regard congressional intent as the 
touchstone of statutory interpretation, the message of Title VII’s 
legislative history cannot be missed.”254 
Both Justices Alito and Kavanaugh in their respective dissents in 
Bostock look at post-enactment history as well.255  They emphasize the fact 
that Congress has had ample opportunities to add sexual orientation to 
Title VII.256  In fact, bills “were before Congress in 1991 when it made 
major changes in Title VII.”257  But the only reason the dissents in Bostock 
even look at congressional intent is because the dissenters believe that the 
word “sex” is ambiguous, unlike the majority.  So, if all this turns on 
whether or not a word in a statute is ambiguous, what decides that? 
C. Why Argue Ambiguity? 
The precedential values of these cases are drastically different.  In 
Return Mail, the Court narrowed in on deciding if the federal government 
was a “person” who could use the America Invents Act.258  An attorney 
for the U.S. Postal Service stated that “since the AIA was enacted, federal 
agencies have submitted 20 requests for all forms of AIA post-issuance 
review combined.”259  From September 16, 2012, until February 28, 2019, 
(the month in which Return Mail was argued), there were 9,858 total 
petitions for post-issuance proceedings.260  Federal agencies account for 
less than 0.3% of all AIA reviews.261  And even further narrowing its 
potential scope, since Return Mail has been decided, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled the Federal Reserve Bank 
is a “person” under the AIA.262 
But Bostock is different.  The decision provides workplace protection 
for “1.5 million transgender and 11.5 million lesbian, gay and bisexual 
people” across the United States.263  And the case is not simply addressing 
 
 254.   Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1777 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 255.   Id.; id. at 1824 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  
 256.   Id. at 1777 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1824 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 257.   Id. at 1777 (Alito, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 258.   See generally Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853 (2019). 
 259.   Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853 
(2019) (No. 17-1594). 
 260.   Pat. Trial & Appeal Bd., Trial Statistics IPR, PGR, CBM,  U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
10 (Feb. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics_ 
2019_february.pdf [https://perma.cc/TB3R-AKXJ].  
 261.   See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text. 
 262.   Bozeman Fin. LLC v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Atlanta, 955 F.3d 971, 974–75 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
 263.   David Cole & Ria Tabacco Mar, The Court Just Teed  
Up LGBTQ Protections for so Much More than Employment,  THE WASH. POST   
 
198 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
isolated discrimination issues seen in the three cases brought before the 
Court.  An estimated “1 in 4 LGBTQ workers reported experiencing 
discrimination” in their workplace in a 2017 study.264 
And while the cases follow similar patterns of analysis, two major 
differences emerge between them.  First, the Bostock dissent is made up 
of Justices Alito and Thomas in one opinion, and Kavanagh in another.265  
And the Return Mail dissent is written by Justice Breyer and joined by 
Justices Ginsburg and Kagan.266  From a political standpoint, the Bostock 
dissenters are conservative justices, and the Return Mail dissenters, liberal 
justices.267  Second, both the majority and dissenting opinions in Bostock 
discuss the concept of ambiguity.268  In Return Mail, the word is never 
mentioned. 
 The dissenters in Return Mail look at the full range of statutory 
interpretation tools, including purpose and legislative history of the 
statute.269  This comes as no surprise because the opinion was written by 
Justice Breyer, a purposivist.  The dissenting opinion in Bostock, written 
by Justice Alito and joined by Justice Thomas, also looks to purpose and 
legislative history but first determines that the word “sex” is ambiguous in 
order to look at elements outside of the text and context of the statute.270 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the makeup of the Court continues to change, so does the ideology 
of its justices.  While some dig firmly into one school of thought on 
statutory interpretation, many others utilize different methods depending 
on the case at hand.  However, the methods of statutory interpretation, 
which are meant to create consistency throughout the jurisprudence of the 
Court, really could allow judges and justices to pick and choose whichever 
method leans in their favor.  In both Return Mail and Bostock, this choice 
was apparent in the differences in the majority and dissenting opinions.  
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While the majority opinions followed very similar patterns of 
interpretation, definitions, presumptions, and context to overcome, the 
dissents diverged because of the makeup of the justices. 
In Return Mail, the majority did not see the need to examine 
purpose.271  But in Bostock, three of the same justices from the majority in 
Return Mail argued that purpose was important because the word “sex” 
was ambiguous.272  But a judge or justice could argue a statute is 
ambiguous to them at any time to unlock any method of statutory 
interpretation they see fit for the case before them.  And of course, that is 
within their discretion.  But in a highly politicized environment, that 
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